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ABSTRACT This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double-sided energy auction involv-
ing buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islandedmode. A distributed auction
algorithm that can be implemented by an aggregator, as well as a possible approach by which the agents
may approximate price anticipation is considered. Equilibrium conditions arising due to price anticipation is
analyzed. A modified auction to mitigate the resulting loss in efficiency due to such behavior is suggested.
Thismodified auction allows the aggregate social welfare of the agents to be arbitrarily close to that attainable
with price taking agents. Next, equilibrium conditions when the aggregator collects a surcharge price per unit
of energy traded is examined. A bi-objective optimization problem is identified that takes into account both
the agents’ social welfare as well as the aggregator’s revenue from the surcharge. The results of extensive
simulations, which corroborate the theoretical analysis, are reported.
INDEX TERMS Energy grid, microgrid, aggregator, agents, trading, auction, bid, social welfare.
NOMENCLATURE
2 Network model representation
D Set of buyer agents
S Set of seller agents
NB Number of buyer agents, where NB = |D|
NS Number of seller agents, where NS = |S|
i Index of a buyer, where i ∈ D
j Index of a seller, where j ∈ S
k Index of iteration
ui Utility function of the ith buyer
u′i Marginal utility of the ith buyer
gj Generation capacity of the jth seller
vj Utility function of the jth seller
v′j Marginal Utility of the jth seller
A A set representing the aggregator parameters
di Demand delivered to the ith buyer
sj Supply delivered to the jth seller
bi Buying price bid placed by the ith buyer
b0 Buying price bid placed by the virtual agent
aj Availability declared by jth seller
a0 Availability declared by the virtual agent
p The per unit market price of energy
ps Per unit surcharge price by the aggregator
a◦j Solution to seller j’s problem for availability
corresponding to price p.
βi Market power of the ith buyer
αj Market power of the jth seller
pii Equivalent utility function of the ith buyer under
price anticipation
pij Equivalent utility function of the jth seller under
price anticipation
5 Social welfare maximization problem objective
function under price anticipation
d†i Social welfare maximizing solution under price
anticipation for the ith buyer
a†j Social welfare maximizing solution under price
anticipation for the jth seller
U† Social welfare attained under price anticipation
U Social welfare maximizing objective function
under price taking
d∗i Efficient (price taking) solution for the ith buyer
a∗j Efficient (price taking) solution for the jth seller
U∗ Maximum attainable social welfare
corresponding to the efficient solution.
p∗ The market price under equilibrium
pOPTs Optimal per unit surcharge price by
the aggregator
D Aggregate demand function
A Aggregate availability function
L2 Loss in efficiency
R Aggregator revenue function
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 Social welfare maximization objective function
with aggregator surcharge ps
B Sum of bids of all the buyers.
LS Lagrangian corresponding to the seller’s
optimization problem
ρj Dual variable in LS corresponding to the constraint
aj < gj in seller’s optimization problem
L5 Lagrangian corresponding to the social welfare
maximization problem under price anticipation
LU Lagrangian corresponding to the social welfare
maximization problem under price taking
L Lagrangian corresponding to the social welfare
maximization problem under price taking with
aggregator surcharge
λj Dual variable in L5, LU and L corresponding
to the generation constraint aj < gj
µ Dual variable in L5, LU and L
corresponding to the energy balance constraint.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network economics has made automated trading feasible,
where resources are exchanged for money through trans-
actions that are done entirely through software agents and
without the need for any human intervention. It is often the
case that the agents participating in the trade are involved
in direct competition with one another, where the objective
of each agent is to maximize its own payoff. In these sit-
uations the trade proceeds through an auction mechanism.
In single-sided auctions all agents are either buyers that com-
pete to acquire a finite resource, or sellers that compete to
sell their goods. Double auctions are mechanisms involving
both buyers and sellers, which simultaneously participate in
the bidding process and are allocated individual shares of the
resource.
Recent technological advancements in communications
and renewable energy generation have created much research
interest in energy auction algorithms [1], [2]. In these mech-
anisms, the agents may represent individual domestic units
within a microgrid, with energy representing the resource,
and with PV-equipped homes experiencing a surplus of
energy acting as sellers, and the remaining domestic units as
buyers [3]. An agent may also represent an individual micro-
grid involving a community of homes that collectively behave
as a single unit in the ensuing auction [5]. A buyer agent’s
payoff is typically the difference between its utility gained
from consuming a certain amount of energy and the price that
it has to pay in order to procure that energy. Likewise a seller
agent’s payoff may be formulated as the sum of the monetary
gain from supplying an amount of energy and utility it gains
from retaining any surplus energy that is not traded.
The Kelly mechanism refers to a class of auction algo-
rithms where agents are allowed to place individual bids on
the resource, while a separate auctioneer that receives these
bids, allocates the resource share of each bidding agent in
proportion to the bid values [5]. With a large number of
agents, such a proportional allocation mechanism has been
shown to maximize the aggregate utilities of all agents, the
latter commonly referred to as the social welfare [6]–[8].
Such social welfare maximizing mechanisms are efficient
auctions.
Unfortunately, the underlying assumption for proportional
allocation to be efficient is that the agents be price takers,
i.e. ones that assume that the bids that they place do not
influence the market price of the resource. While this is
approximately true for auctions involving a large number of
agents, in smaller auctions, agents are aware of their own
market power, and accordingly, place strategic bids on the
resource. Such a price anticipatory bidding results in a loss
in efficiency where the resource allocation of the auction no
longer maximizes the social welfare.
It must be noted that there are other efficient auctions
that explicitly focus on eliciting truthful bidding from the
bidders; the most significant ones being based on the well-
known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism [9]. Furthermore,
auctions designed to maximize the auctioneer’s own earned
revenue have been proposed in the vast body of literature on
this subject. However, these mechanisms are not of direct
relevance in this research, which focuses on efficient dou-
ble auctions along with proportional allocation of electricity
among its buyers.
A. CURRENT RESEARCH
Proportional allocation in single-sided buyers’ auctions has
been rigorously analyzed [7], [10]. It is shown that the auc-
tion is efficient under the assumption of price taking buyers.
Furthermore, when the agents’ utilities are strictly concave
functions, the seminal study in [7] establishes a strong the-
oretical upper limit on the auction’s loss of efficiency at 1/4
of the maximum attainable social welfare. More recently, it
has been shown that even when buyers are price anticipating,
proportional allocation allows the mechanism to attain the
best possible outcome [11]. Similar theoretical limits have
been investigated for a more general class of auctions called
smooth auctions with proportional allocation [12]. Theoreti-
cal properties of a situation with multiple sellers participating
in a proportional allocating auction, and with inelastic (fixed)
demand for the resource has been examined [13].
When the proportional allocation auction takes into
account the costs of the network’s links through which the
resource (data) flows, the efficiency is shown to be at least
4
√
2–5 of the social welfare maximumwith price anticipating
buyers and with convex costs [14]. In a separate study it has
been shown that when the costs are linear, the mechanism’s
efficiency loss is lower bounded at 1/3 of the maximum
value [15]. Unfortunately, the previous studies are based on
the assumption that the utility functions’ are convex. Under
a more general setting where this convexity assumption is
not true, the mechanism’s efficiency loss no longer enjoys
a theoretical limit, and could in fact be arbitrarily large [8].
A few studies have proposed schemes to address an auction’s
efficiency loss arising from price anticipation. For instance
an auction mechanism with price differentiation where each
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buyer has a different price, has been proposed [16]. This
study also suggests a feedback control mechanism on the
price vector that drives the auction to converge to the globally
optimum social welfare.
Double auction mechanisms with proportional allocation
have been studied [17]. However, this study considers only
the case of price takers. The research reported in this paper
includes a theoretical study on both price anticipating buyers
and price anticipating sellers participating simultaneously in
a double auction.
Research on energy auctions has closely followed the the-
oretical advancement in mechanism design. A large body of
recent literature on energy auction algorithms model large
utility company as the sellers [18]–[22]. Many of these stud-
ies consider objectives and/or constraints that are applicable
only to energy trade, such as generation scheduling [18], [20],
economic dispatch [22], and transmission losses [23]. Some
energy auction studies are designed for revenuemaximization
and are not social welfare maximizing (efficient) mecha-
nisms [19], [22].
Efficient auctions have begun to gain research attention
in the present context energy trade. Several such inves-
tigations do not consider proportionally fair allocation of
energy [24]–[26]. One recent study proposes a VCG-style
auction with multiple sellers and a single demand response
aggregator as the buyer [27]. Another study that uses theVCG
mechanism reports a double auction [28]. The cake-cutting
algorithm has been applied to procure energy from multiple
sellers and for a community of consumers acting in tandem
as a single buyer [29]. A truthful buyers’ auction that makes
use of the Arrow-d’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet mechanism has
been suggested [30].
While some existing approaches as well as this research
explore Nash equilibrium, where all agents are assumed to
act simultaneously [4], [27], [31], others use leader-follower
games under Stackelberg equilibrium [24], [21], [25], [32].
This equilibrium concept is applicable when the energy mar-
ket is modeled as an oligopoly with only a limited number of
suppliers modeled as leader, or with the inclusion of an upper
level agent such as an aggregator [24], [25], [27], [32]. This
is in contrast to the present work that treats both buyers and
sellers with equivalent market parity.
Many research papers in the existing research on energy
auctions report only single-sided ones [4], [20], [21], [27],
[29]–[31]. However, there are some papers that do address
some form of double auction [19], [22], [23], [28], [32], [33].
One of them analyzes the loss of efficiency arising from
Stackelberg equilibrium where the leading agent enjoys a
first-mover’s advantage in the underlying game [32]. Another
paper on double energy auctions, that proposes a primal-
dual algorithm, is based on the unrealistic assumption that all
agents – buyers and sellers, act in concert to lower the overall
grid cost [23]. Yet another such study considers a double
auction where the energy sellers are utility companies whose
goal is revenue maximization [23]. A preliminary study on
double energy auction based on the Kelly mechanism has
been proposed [3]. Another double auction study that does not
use proportional allocation addresses software issues rather
than the auction [33].
Moreover, none of these single or double energy auctions
address the issue of price anticipatory behavior of the par-
ticipating agents. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, only
one research in the literature on efficient energy auctions does
examine the adverse effect of price anticipation [31]. This
study is a single-sided auction with consumers of electricity
acting as price anticipating buyers. The theoretical derivation
of the auction’s loss of efficiency closely follows that in ear-
lier theoretical studies on single-sided auctions [7], [10], [11].
A few of the extant research on energy auctions applies
some form of price differentiation [3], [23], [25], [28], [29].
Although this paper does not explicitly do so, it is worthwhile
to mention that the research reported here can be readily
extended to address this scenario as theoretical research on
such mechanisms has been published [16].
B. CONTRIBUTION
This research proposes a double auction mechanism that
includes one set of agents as buyers, and another set as sellers.
It also assumes the presence of a separate mediating agent
called the aggregator whose role, unless indicated otherwise,
is to (i) receive monetary bids from the buyers and available
energy for trade from the sellers; (ii) proportionally allocate
energy to the buyers; (iii) iteratively converge to the market
clearing price.
The main contributions of this research are as follows.
(i) It performs a theoretical analysis of the equilibrium con-
ditions arising from price anticipating buyers and sellers,
thereby extending previous studies on single-sided auctions
to double auctions. It shows the existence of a unique equi-
librium for double auctions under price anticipation.
(ii) It proposes a distributed iterative auction algorithm, and
suggests a possible realistic scheme through which the selfish
agents may use information from prior iterations to approx-
imate price anticipating behavior without any knowledge of
the other agents.
(iii) It shows that, unlike in single sided auctions, double
auctions can readily minimize the loss of efficiency arising
from price anticipation, suggesting a simple extension of
proportional allocation in order to approach the minimum.
(iv) It shows how the aggregator’s own revenue can be incor-
porated within the auction framework, and proposes how this
can lead to a bi-objective optimization problem where the
aggregator is no longer strictly selfless by establishing the
presence of a Pareto front within specific bounds.
It must be emphasized that although this research considers
energy as the traded resource, the underlying theoretical anal-
ysis is directly applicable to other divisible resource auctions.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following man-
ner. Section II presents the framework of the auction. The
double auction under conditions of price anticipation and
price taking are outlined in sections III and IV. The proofs of
the propositions made in both sections have been postponed
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until the appendix. The results obtained from simulations are
discussed in section V. Finally, the conclusion of this research
is derived in section VI.
II. FRAMEWORK
A. NETWORK MODEL
With energy as the resource involved in the trade, the net-
work of agents in our model consists of a set D of buyers
and another set S of sellers. Although grid energy auctions
typically involve the presence of prosumers that buy and sell
energy, we assume for simplicity that D and S are disjoint.
The model also includes a separate entity, A, the aggregator
(or auctioneer) that is responsible for communicating with the
other agents and implementing the auction. Unless otherwise
indicated the aggregator acts as a selfless agent, requiring no
separate parametrization of its own, in which case A = ∅.
Each agent, whether a buyer or a seller, has its own utility
representing the gain (in monetary units) it derives from
consuming an amount of energy. The utility of a buyer i ∈ D
is denoted as ui, and that of a seller j ∈ S , as vj. As the sellers
are capable of supplying energy, the model assumes that each
has a fixed amount of energy gj, called its generation that is
available both for its own use and to sell.
The underlying physical network that implements the auc-
tion mechanism can be completely defined as the following
6-tuple 2,
2 ,
(D,S, gj, ui, vj,A) . (1)
The mathematical treatment made throughout the rest of this
paper is based on the following underlying assumptions.
(i) The utilities ui and vj are continuous, differentiable,
monotonically increasing and strictly concave functions
with non-negative arguments. In other words, u′i, v′j> 0 and
u′′i , v′′j < 0 when the argument lies within the interval (0,∞).
(ii) There is at least one buyer and one seller, i.e. D,
S 6= ∅, and furthermore that at least one buyer i ∈ D can
obtain energy from some seller j ∈ S so that some trade takes
place. This assumption can be summarized as follows.
∃i ∈ D, j ∈ S,3 u′i (0) > v′j
(
gj
)
. (2)
B. AUCTION PROCESS
The buyers’ and sellers’ bidding processes are implemented
as separate steps in the auction. Each buyer i receives from
the aggregator its demand di, which is the amount of energy
that is allocated for use. The buyer responds by communi-
cating to the aggregator its bid bi, which is the amount of
money that it is willing to pay for it. Separately, each seller
j receives a per unit price p of energy, and communicates
back to the aggregator, its availability aj that it is willing to
supply.
The schematic below (Fig. 1.) shows the layout of the
entire auction process. The auction proceeds iteratively
until termination when p converges to the market clearing
price.
FIGURE 1. Schematic of the network model showing flow of information
during auction.
III. DOUBLE AUCTION UNDER PRICE ANTICIPATION
A. AGGREGATOR
It is assumed that there is no energy loss taking place during
transmission. Thus, with the network operating under iso-
lation as is also assumed in this section, the total amount
of energy that is declared available by the sellers must be
equal to the total amount demanded by the buyers, so that
the following energy balance equation holds.∑
i
di =
∑
j
aj. (3)
In this section the aggregator is also assumed to be selfless
and plays no additional role other than that specified earlier
(A = ∅), so that the money received as the total buyers’ bids
is exchanged for the total available energy sold by the sellers.
Under these circumstances, the per unit price is given by,
p =
(∑
j
aj
)−1∑
i
bi. (4)
As the auction is based on proportional allocation of
resources, the energy demand di that each buyer i receives
from the aggregator must be proportional to its bid bi so that,
di = bip , ∀i ∈ D. (5)
B. BUYER
Each buyer i aims to maximize its payoff from the auction
mechanism. Noting that it has to pay an amount bi in order
to receive energy di, it places a bid bi in accordance with the
following optimization problem.
Maximize w.r.t. bi:
ui (di)− bi. (6)
Proposition-1: The optimal bidding strategy of a buyer
i ∈ D is,
bi = diu′i (di) (1− βi) . (7)
Here the quantity βi is the market power of buyer i described
later in this section.
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C. SELLER
Each seller j declares its availability aj at price p to the
aggregator to attain the maximum of its payoff, which is
the sum of the money that it receives from selling energy as
well as its own utility from consuming the remaining amount
gj−aj of energy. Noting that its availability cannot exceed its
generation gj, its participation in the auction is characterized
by means of the following optimization problem.
Maximize w.r.t. aj:
vj
(
gj − aj
)+ paj. (8)
Subject to:
aj ≤ gj. (9)
Proposition-2: The optimal bidding strategy of a seller
j ∈ S is given by the expression below.
aj = min
{
a◦j , gj
}
, (10)
where a◦j is the solution to the equation,
v′j
(
gj − a◦j
)
= p (1− αj) (11)
The seller’s market power αj is described below.
D. MARKET POWER
The market power of an agent reflects its ability to influence
the overall outcome of the auction.When the auction involves
a large number of agents, an individual agent’s action cannot
exert a great deal of influence on the outcome; consequently
the agent’s market power is low. In the limiting case when
there are an infinite number of agents, the market power
approaches zero. It is this limiting case that price taking
conditions serves to approximate.
In the present case, themarket powerβi of every buyer i and
αj that of sellers can be defined through separate expressions,
given below,
βi =
(∑
i′
bi′
)−1
bi, ∀i ∈ D, (12)
αj =
(∑
j′
aj′
)−1
aj, ∀j ∈ S. (13)
The level of awareness of each buyer or seller about the
remaining agents can vary from complete unawareness (price
taking) to full awareness of the others’ bidding strategies (as
required in Eqns. (12) and (13) above). A realistic scenario
lies somewhere in between. In such a case, the iterative
auction would allow the buyer or seller to approximate its
market power from the information gleaned from previous
iterations. The expressions below, which are derived from
Eqns. (7) – (11) can be used as themeans bywhich each buyer
or seller can obtain such estimates. Superscripts (k − 1) and
(k) have been introduced for clarity to indicate each iteration
k and its immediately preceding iteration k − 1.
β
(k)
i = 1−
b(k−1)i
d (k−1)i u′i
(
d (k−1)i
) , (14)
α
(k)
j = 1−
1
p(k−1)
(
v′j
(
gj − a(k−1)j
)
− ρ(k−1)j
)
. (15)
Note that neither expression above incorporates quantities
pertaining to the other agents present in the network.
The quantity ρj in Eqn. (15) is a dual variable obtained from
the constrained optimization problem in Eqns. (8) and (9).
Further details pertaining to ρj can be found in the appendix.
It suffices to mention that ρj = 0 except in the case when
the seller declares its entire generation as the availability, i.e.
aj = gj.
At the onset of the auction process (k = 1), when the
agents lack prior information, the market powers may be
initialized to zero so that the agents act as simple price takers.
E. DISTRIBUTED DOUBLE AUCTION ALGORITHM
Before the iterative bidding process takes place, there are sev-
eral ways by which the aggregator can initialize the auction
variables p and the dis that it communicates to the sellers
and buyers so that they can place their bids. An effective
way to minimize the number of steps would be to use stored
historical information from previous rounds. Otherwise the
aggregator may use heuristic means to do so. In the most sim-
plistic case, these variables may be assigned randomly. This
initialization and the subsequent auction steps are outlined in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Distributed Double Auction Algorithm
Initialize p(0), d (0)i ∀i ∈ D
//Buyers i ∈ D: βi← 0
//Sellers j ∈ S: αj← 0
Set k ← 1
While (termination criterion = ‘F’)
Send p(k)to sellers j ∈ S
//Sellers j ∈ S bid
Receive a(k)j from sellers j ∈ S
Send d (k)i to buyers i ∈ D
//Buyers i ∈ D bid
Receive b(k)i from buyers i ∈ D
Increment k ← k + 1
Obtain d (k)i
Update p(k)
//Buyers estimate β(k)i
//Sellers estimate α(k)j
Evaluate termination criterion
End
F. EQUILIBRIUM
The auction steps described earlier terminates when further
updates of neither the price p nor any of the bids submitted
by the agents to the aggregator are changed. This is when
generalized Nash equilibrium [34] is established.
In order to characterize the equilibrium conditions under
price anticipation, the functions pii(·) and pij(·) are introduced
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below,
pii (di) =
(
1−
(∑
j
aj
)−1
di
)
ui (di)
+
(∑
j
aj
)−1 di∫
0
ui (z) dz, (16)
pij
(
gj − aj
) = vj (gj − aj) (∑j′ aj′) (∑j′ 6=j aj′)−1
−
(∑
j′ 6=j aj′
)−1 aj∫
0
vj
(
gj − z
)
dz. (17)
The effect of price anticipation can be examined in terms of
the following constrained optimization problem.
Maximize w.r.t. di, aj:
5
(
di, aj|2
) =∑
i
pii (di)+
∑
j
pij
(
gj − aj
)
. (18)
Subject to constraints in Eqns. (3) and (9) which are
restated below, ∑
i
di =
∑
j
aj,
aj ≤ gj.
Denoting the solutions of the above maximization problem
as d†i and a
†
j , the social welfare is U
† , U
(
d†i , a
†
j |2
)
.
Additionally, the maximum social welfare corresponding to
the efficient solution is denoted as U∗.
Proposition-3: (i) There exists a unique equilibrium of the
double auction where the demand di of each buyer i ∈ D and
availability aj of each seller j ∈ S is the solution to the opti-
mization problem defined in Eqn. (18) with Eqns. (3) and (9)
as constraints.
(ii) The social welfare attained under price anticipation is
no greater than that attainable under price taking, i.e.,
U† ≤ U∗. (19)
The above statement implies that there is a loss of efficiency
due to price anticipation.
IV. DOUBLE AUCTION UNDER PRICE TAKING
A. EFFICIENT SOLUTION
The efficient solution can be obtained from the following
constrained optimization problem.
Maximize w.r.t. di, aj:
U
(
di, aj|2
) =∑
i
ui (di)+
∑
j
vj
(
gj − aj
)
. (20)
Subject to constraints in Eqns. (3) and (9) which are
restated below. ∑
i
di =
∑
j
aj.
aj ≤ gj,∀j ∈ S.
For the sake of convenience the buyer i’s bidding strategy,
which is that in Eqn. (7) with βi = 0, is provided below.
bi = diu′i (di) . (21)
The seller j’s strategy is determined according to
Eqns. (10) and (11) where αj = 0, and given below,
aj = min
{
a◦j , gj
}
, (22)
where a◦j is the solution to the equation,
v′j
(
gj − a◦j
)
= p. (23)
Proposition-4: Under the assumption that the buyers and
sellers are price takers, the following statements are true for
the double auction.
(i) The buyer and seller strategies are defined according to
Eqns. (21), (22) and (23).
(ii) The equilibrium demand d∗i of each buyer i and avail-
ability a∗j of each seller j after the termination of the auction
are unique solutions of Eqns. (3), (9) and (20).
(iii) There is no loss in efficiency, i.e.
U∗ , U
(
d∗i , a∗j |2
)
= max
di,aj
U
(
di, aj|2
)
. (24)
Thus the unique equilibrium of the double auction is also the
efficient solution.
Themarket price at equilibrium from the auction is denoted
as p∗. At equilibrium, the derivative of the utility function
(also called marginal utility) of each buyer and that of each
seller that is not trading its entire generation gj is equal to the
market price; and for traders that trade all of it, more than the
price. Mathematically,
u′i
(
d∗i
) = p∗;
v′j
(
gj − a∗j
)
= p∗ when a∗j < gj;
v′j
(
gj − a∗j
)
> p∗ when a∗j = gj;
(25)
The equilibrium can be understood readily graphically as
shown in Fig. 2(a). Here, we define the aggregate demand
function D (p) as the total amount of energy delivered to the
buyers as a function of themarket price p. Likewise, we define
the availability function A (p) as the total availability declared
by the suppliers as a function of p. Thus,
D (p) =
∑
i
di, (26)
A (p) =
∑
j
aj. (27)
Proposition-5: Under the assumption of price taking, the
following statements are true for the double auction.
(i) The availability function A (p) is zero when p ≤
minj v′j
(
gj
)
, monotonically increasing with price p in the
interval p ∈
(
minj v′j
(
gj
)
,maxj v′j (0)
)
and constant when
p ≥ maxj v′j (0). In other words,
A (p) = 0, p ≤ v′j
(
gj
);
A (p)mon.inc., min
j
v′j
(
gj
)
< p < max
j
v′j (0);
A (p) constant, p ≥ max
j
v′j (0).
(28)
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FIGURE 2. Plots of the A
(
p
)
and D
(
p
)
as functions of p. In the x-axis,
l = minj v ′j
(
gj
)
, m = maxj v ′j
(
0
)
, and n = maxi u′i
(
0
)
. (a) Equilibrium
conditions under price taking. (b) The addition of surcharge price with
revenue R being the area shaded in grey.
(ii) The demand function D (p) is monotonically decreas-
ing with price p in the interval p ∈ (0,maxi u′i (0)) and zero
when p ≥ maxi u′i (0).D (p)mon.dec., p < maxi u
′
i (0),
D (p) = 0, p ≥ max
i
u′i (0).
(29)
(iii) At the unique equilibrium price p∗, A (p∗) = D (p∗).
B. VIRTUAL BIDDING
In general, the loss of efficiency, when di is the demand of
each buyer i, and aj, the allocation of each seller j, can be
expressed as follows.
L2(di, aj) =
U
(
d∗i , a∗j |2
)
− U (di, aj|2)
U
(
d∗i , a∗j |2
) . (30)
The loss that takes place when the agents participate in the
auction as price anticipators is L2(d
†
i , a
†
j ). This section shows
how the basic proportional allocation double auction mecha-
nism can be extended to mitigate the loss of efficiency.
In order to minimize the loss L2, a virtual agent can be
introduced to the network defined earlier in Eqn. (1). The
virtual agent, which is indexed with the subscript ‘0’, par-
ticipates in the auction simultaneously as a buyer and a seller
with arbitrarily large availability a0. As the virtual agent is
incorporated within the aggregator, we let A = {a0}.
Since the virtual agent does not have its own generation, it
buys back the amount of energy a0 declared as its availability
at the market price defined in Eqn. (4), so that,
b0 = pa0.(31) (31)
Proposition-6: As the virtual agent’s availability a0
increases, the loss in efficiency L2 from price anticipation
decreases. In the limiting case,
lim
a0→∞
L2(d
†
i , a
†
j ) = 0. (32)
Since the inclusion of virtual bidding allows the auction to
behave like a price taking mechanism, for the remainder of
this section we assume that the buyers and sellers behave as
price takers.
C. SURCHARGE
We now consider the situation where the aggregator, A, is
no longer a strictly selfless enabler in the auction process
but also has its own incentive to implement the mechanism
by levying a surcharge price ps per unit of energy traded.
Thus in the model in Eqn. (1) the aggregator now includes
the surcharge, which we indicate by letting it be given by
A = {a0 → ∞, ps}. The total revenue earned by the aggre-
gator from the auction with the introduction of surcharge is
given by,
R = ps
∑
j
aj. (33)
The expression for the price in Eqn. (4) is modified to account
for the surcharge as follows,∑
i
bi = (p+ ps)
∑
j
aj. (34)
With proportional allocation, the demand di that each buyer
i receives is given by the following expression that replaces
the earlier Eqn. (5),
di = bips + p . (35)
Fig. 2(b) illustrates the effect of the surcharge. Eqn. (35)
shows that the buyers purchase energy at an effective per
unit price of ps + p which is higher than p that the sellers
receive per unit of energy traded. The volume of energy
traded is equal to D (ps + p) = A (p), which is lower than
A (p∗) = D (p∗).
We show that the price taking auction is the solution to the
following constrained optimization problem.
Maximize w.r.t. di, aj:

(
di, aj|2
) =∑
i
ui (di)+
∑
j
vj
(
gj − aj
)
− ps
∑
j
aj. (36)
Subject to constraints in Eqns. (3) and (9),∑
i
di =
∑
j
aj, aj ≤ gj.
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Proposition-7: Under the assumption of price taking, the
following statements are true with surcharge price ps > 0.
(i) The buyer and seller strategies are defined according to
Eqns. (21), (22) and (23).
(ii) The equilibrium demand di of each buyer i and avail-
ability aj of each seller j of the auction are unique solutions
of Eqns. (3), (9) and (36).
(iii) There exists a Pareto front where any increase in
revenue R is associated with a simultaneous decrease in the
social welfare in Eqn. (20).
(iv) There exists an optimal surcharge pOPTs that maximizes
the aggregator A’s revenue R.
V. RESULTS
A. SETUP
In order to compliment the theoretical considerations in the
earlier sections, several sets of simulations were carried out.
A total of five scenarios were considered, where the number
of buyers and sellers were |D| = 2, |S| = 3, |D| = 2,
|S| = 6, |D| = 2, |S| = 10, |D| = 3, |S| = 2 and
|D| = 4, |S| = 4. In order to analyze the effect of price
anticipation, the total number of agents were made relatively
small in comparison to other simulation studies. Moreover,
the first three scenarios contain only 2 sellers. This reflects
the situation is a realistic microgrid, where the number of
PV-equipped units is usually lower than the number of those
without it. The fourth and fifth scenarios were added to
explore the performance of the double auction under other
potential situations.
The utilities of the buyers and sellers assumed to follow
logarithmic saturation curves according to,
ui (di) = xi log (yidi + 1), (37)
and,
vj
(
gj − aj
) = xj log (yj(gj − aj)+ 1). (38)
The quantities xi, yi, xj and yj were different for each agent,
and were generated randomly from a uniform distribution
centered at unity. The generations, gj, for the sellers were also
drawn in at random, uniformly in the interval [gmin, gmax].
B. PRICE ANTICIPATION
The first set of simulations was performed to examine the
effect of price anticipation of the buyers and sellers upon the
double auction. The results of this study are shown in Fig. 3.
It can be seen that in each case there is a reduction in the social
welfare due to price anticipation. More detailed analysis
shows that when considered separately, while the social wel-
fare of the buyers reduces due to price anticipation, the social
welfare of the sellers is increased. This is because Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 indicate that price anticipation (βi, αj > 0)
causes the values of di and aj to be lower than with price
taking (βi, αj = 0). Consequently, the volume of energy
being traded is also less so that the surplus amount of energy
gj − aj remaining with each seller j is higher, which also
increases its utility, vj
(
gj − aj
)
.
FIGURE 3. Social welfare U under price taking (PT) and price
anticipation (PA) for each scenario.
Although, due to price anticipation, the social welfare in
a double auction is lower than its optimal value, the util-
ities of the sellers change in the opposite direction. Thus
an observation made from this study is that the effect of
price anticipatory agents in double-auctions is less severe in
comparison to single-sided auctions.
C. VIRTUAL BIDDING
The effect of virtual bidding was investigated through a
second set of simulations. The results of these simulations
are provided in Fig. 4, separately for each of the five
scenarios.
FIGURE 4. Loss in efficiency L2 as a function of a0 for each scenario.
It can be seen that the loss in efficiency L2 approaches zero
as a0 increases towards a0 → ∞. This observation holds
true for each of the five scenarios that were simulated, and
is consistent with Proposition-6.
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FIGURE 5. The Pareto front of the revenue R and social welfare U with
varying surcharge price ps, for each scenario.
FIGURE 6. Aggregator’s revenue R as a function of surcharge price ps, for
each scenario.
D. SURCHARGE
In order to examine the role of the surcharge price ps on the
double auction, a set of simulations were carried out for each
of the five scenarios described earlier. As price taking condi-
tions are assumed, the agents’ market powers were always set
at βi = 0, αj = 0, throughout the iterative mechanism.
The auction was simulated until equilibrium for different
values of the surcharge price ps. Fig. 5 shows the Pareto front
discussed in the claim (iii) in Proposition-7. In each scenario,
the extreme left end points of the fronts correspond to ps = 0
so that the social welfare is maximum U = U∗, while the
aggregator’s revenue R = 0.
As ps progressively increases until pOPTs , so does R, while
U decreases. The right ends of the Pareto fronts correspond
to ps = pOPTs . When ps exceeds pOPTs , bothU and R decrease,
which is not shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 6 shows how the aggregator’s revenue R varies with
surcharge ps. In each scenario, R increases with ps until it
reaches its maximum when the surcharge is pOPTs . In all but
one scenario, the revenue R can be seen to decrease beyond
its correspondingmaximum. These results are consistent with
claim (iv) of Proposition-7.
VI. CONCLUSION
The distributed double auction algorithm in Section-III can be
implemented readily by the aggregator, even in the presence
of a virtual agent or with surcharge pricing. The algorithm
can optionally consider price-anticipatory agents. A possible
method by which real world agents may use information
gathered from earlier iteration to imitate price anticipation
has been suggested.
It is shown that with price anticipating agents, the double
auction’s equilibrium coincides with that of a constrained
optimization problem whose objective function5 is different
from the social welfare function U , resulting in a loss of
efficiency. It is shown that when the aggregator incorporates a
virtual agent that is simultaneously both a buyer and a seller,
can minimize the loss of efficiency, so that the double auction
can reach the efficient equilibrium.
A generalized auction scenario where the aggregator
receives a surcharge price is investigated where in the limiting
case, the aggregator may act as a selfish agent trying to
maximize its revenue R from the auction. With the social
welfare U and revenue R as independent objectives, a bi-
objective framework for the double auction mechanism is
suggested.
The theoretical analysis has been supplemented by several
simulations. The results of the simulations are in complete
agreement with the theory.
APPENDIX
Let,
A =
∑
j
aj.
B =
∑
i
bi.
Proof of Proposition-1: The stationary condition of
Eqn. (6) is obtained by differentiation with respect to the
bid bi as shown below.
u′i (di)
∂di
∂bi
= 1.
As buyer i is price anticipating, di is dependent on bi through
the price p. Hence replacing ∂di
∂bi
appropriately using Eqn. (5)
and applying the chain rule we get,
u′i (di)
1
p
(
1− bi
p
∂p
∂bi
)
= 1. (A1)
Using Eqn. (4) the above equality yields,
u′i (di)
(
1− bi
B
)
= p. (A2)
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Whence from Eqn. (12),
u′i (di) (1− βi) = p. (A3)
Proposition-1 follows directly from the above and
Eqn. (5). 
Proof of Proposition-2: Introducing the dual variable ρj,
the Lagrangian of the problem defined in Eqns. (8) and (9) is,
LS
(
aj, ρj
) = vj (gj − aj)+ paj + ρj (aj − gj) .
This yields the following KKT conditions.
ρj
(
aj − gj
) = 0, (A4)
v′j
(
gj − aj
) = p+ aj ∂p
∂aj
+ ρj. (A5)
Replacing ∂p
∂aj
above appropriately using Eqn. (4),
v′j
(
gj − aj
) = p (1− αj)+ ρj. (A6)
The quantity αj is defined in Eqn. (13). When aj < gj,
Eqn. (A4) shows that ρj = 0. The corresponding availability
in Eqn. (A6) is equal to a◦j that solves Eqn. (11). The other
situation in (A4) arises when ρj < 0, in which case the entire
generated energy is declared available, i.e. aj = gj.
We can rewrite the above observations more concisely as,{
ρj = 0, aj < gj;
ρj < 0, aj = gj. (A7)

Proof of Proposition-3: Observe that, using Eqns. (3), (12)
and (13), the derivatives of the functions defined earlier in
Eqns. (16) and (17) are,
∂
∂di
pii = (1− βi) u′i (di) , (A8)
∂
∂aj
pij = − 11− αj v
′
j
(
gj − aj
)
. (A9)
From Eqn. (12) since βi > 0, whenever di > 0, ∂∂dipii > 0
in Eqn. (A8). The factor (1− βi) in Eqn. (A8) is also strictly
decreasing in bi and hence di. Thus ∂∂dipii is also monotoni-
cally decreasing. Therefore pii is a strictly concave function.
In a similar manner, from Eqn. (13) it is clear that αj < 1 as
long as 0 ≤ aj ≤ gj, so that ∂∂ajpij < 0 in Eqn. (A9). Besides
as 11−αj is strictly increasing, the product is monotonically
decreasing. Therefore pij is strictly concave. Thus there is a
unique maximum of 5
(
di, aj|2
)
as defined in Eqn. (18).
The Lagrangian of the problem defined in Eqn. (18), with
Eqns. (3) and (9) acting as constraints, is given by,
L5
(
di, aj, λj, µ
)
=
∑
i
pii (di)+
∑
j
pij
(
gj − aj
)
+
∑
j
λj
(
aj − gj
)+ µ (∑
j
aj −
∑
i
di
)
. (A10)
The quantities µ and λj above are the dual variables intro-
duced by the constraints in Eqns. (3) and (9). The pri-
mal conditions from Eqns. (3) and (9) must be satisfied.
Furthermore, complementary slackness conditions yield,
λj
(
aj − gj
) = 0. (A11)
From Eqns. (A8) and (A9), the stationary conditions of
Eqn. (A10) must satisfy,
(1− βi) u′i (di) = µ, (A12)
v′j
(
gj − aj
) = (1− αj) (λj + µ) . (A13)
From Eqns. (A3) and (A12) it is observed that µ = p. Using
Eqn. (5) it is seen that the buyer’s bidding strategy defined in
Eqn. (7) is satisfied.
When aj < gj, Eqn. (A11) shows that λj = 0. Replacing
λj and µ with 0 and p, Eqn. (11) is satisfied. On the other
hand, when aj = gj, λj is set to an appropriate value.
From the concavity assumption, v′j
(
gj − aj
)
< p
(
1− αj
)
so that λj < 0. We summarize these observations as
follows. 
p = µ;
λj < 0 when aj = gj;
λj = 0 when aj < gj.
(A14)
From the above considerations, it is seen that in both cases
Eqn. (A13) satisfies the seller’s bidding strategy in Eqn. (10).
Eqn. (19) is trivially true since U∗ which is defined in
Eqn. (24) is the maximum social welfare. 
Proof of Proposition-4: First, note that since the utilities are
strictly concave, there is a unique optimum of the optimiza-
tion problem defined in Eqn. (20) with constraints defined in
Eqns. (3) and (9). The Lagrangian is,
LU
(
di, aj, λj, µ
)
=
∑
i
ui (di)+
∑
j
vj
(
gj − aj
)
+
∑
j
λj
(
aj − gj
)+ µ (∑
j
aj −
∑
i
di
)
. (A15)
The stationary conditions satisfy,
λj
(
aj − gj
) = 0, (A16)
u′i (di) = µ, (A17)
v′j
(
gj − aj
) = λj + µ. (A18)
Comparing Eqn. (A17) with Eqn. (21), under proportional
allocation in Eqn. (5), we see that µ = p. Replacing ∂p
∂aj
in
Eqn. (A5) with zero, the seller’s stationary conditions satisfy
(A4) and the following,
v′j
(
gj − aj
) = p+ ρj. (A19)
From Eqns. (A17), (A18) and (A19),
p = µ;
λj < 0 when aj = gj;
λj = 0 when aj < gj.
(A20)
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Statements (i) and (ii) follow from the above. Since the
social welfare U
(
di, aj|2
)
is maximized, statement (iii)
holds. 
Proof of Proposition-5: For each seller j, from Eqn. (A7)
it is seen that ρj = 0 when aj < gj. Also αj = 0 under price
taking. Hence from Eqn. (A6),
aj = gj − v′−1j (p) . (A21)
Since v′′j > 0, aj is strictly increasing in the interval
p ∈
(
v′j
(
gj
)
, v′j (0)
)
. Moreover as aj ∈ [0, gj] and as
Eqn. (26) shows, A (p) is the sum of all ajs, statement (i)
follows.
For each buyer i, from Eqn. (A3), with βi = 0,
di = u′−1i (p) . (A22)
Since u
′′
i > 0, di is strictly decreasing with p in the interval
p ∈ (0, u′i (0)). Moreover di = 0 when p ≥ u′i (0). Hence
statement (ii) follows directly from Eqn. (23) where D (p) is
expressed as the sum of all dis.
From Eqn. (2), there is a non-empty interval
p ∈ minj
(
v′j
(
gj
)
,max
(
maxi u′i (0),maxj v′j (0)
))
within
which D (p) is monotonically decreasing or zero and A (p)
is monotonically increasing or fixed at a positive value. Thus
there is a unique p∗ such that A (p∗) = D (p∗). 
Proof of Proposition-6: Since from Eqn. (31) b0 =
pa0, the expression for the price in Eqn. (4) is replaced
with,
p =
(
a0 +
∑
j
aj
)−1 (
b0 +
∑
i
bi
)
. (A23)
With the addition of virtual bidding, Eqns. (12) and (13)
pertaining to market powers are rewritten as,
βi =
(
b0 +
∑
i′
bi′
)−1
bi, ∀i ∈ D, (A24)
αj =
(
a0 +
∑
j′
aj′
)−1
aj, ∀j ∈ S. (A25)
Eqns. (A24) and (A25) show that both βi and αj monotoni-
cally decrease with increasing a0. From Eqns. (A8) and (A9)
it follows that ∂
∂di
pii and ∂∂ajpij monotonically approach
u′i and v′j. As we have shown that pii and pij are strictly con-
cave, it follows that they increasemonotonically with increas-
ing values of a0; whence from Eqn. (18), U† also increases
monotonically. In the limiting case, limb0→∞ βi = 0, and
limb0→∞ αj = 0; whereupon it follows that limb0→∞ U† =
U∗. Simultaneously, from Eqn. (30), the loss of efficiency
decreasesmonotonically towards zero. This shows that insert-
ing the virtual bidder into the auction allows the auction to
simulate price-taking. 
Proof of Proposition-7: The equilibrium of the optimiza-
tion problem defined in Eqn. (36) is unique because the
addition of the linear term involving ps does not alter the
concavity property.
The Lagrangian of the problem defined in Eqn. (36), with
Eqns. (3) and (9) as constraints, is given by,
L
(
di, aj, λj, µ
)
=
∑
i
ui (di)+
∑
j
vj
(
gj − aj
)− ps∑j aj
+
∑
j
λj
(
aj − gj
)+ µ (∑
j
aj −
∑
i
di
)
. (A26)
The stationary conditions satisfy,
λj
(
aj − gj
) = 0, (A27)
u′i (di) = µ+ ps, (A28)
v′j
(
gj − aj
) = λj + µ. (A29)
Analogous to the reasoning provided in the proof of
Proposition-4, it can be established that at equilibrium we
must have, 
p = µ;
λj < 0 when aj = gj;
λj = 0 when aj < gj.
(A30)
This establishes the statements (i) and (ii).
From Eqn. (33), when ps = 0, the revenue R = 0.
However, from the assumption in Eqn. (2), the aggregate
availability A is nonzero. Thus the social welfare is at the
unique maximum U∗ > 0. Increasing ps monotonically
increases the revenue R and also monotonically decreases the
social welfareU . This shows the existence of a non-singleton
Pareto front as claimed in (iii).
It can be readily inferred from Fig. 2(b) that for a suffi-
ciently large value of ps, the aggregate demand is zero, so
that the volume of energy traded is zero and R = 0. In fact
the upper limit of ps is defined as,
ps < max
i
u′i (0)−minj v
′
j
(
gj
)
. (A31)
It is concluded that there is an optimal ps that maxi-
mizes the aggregator’s revenue R verifying the claim in
statement (iv). 
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